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Miner: Tribute

Frank X. Altimari - Humanist Judge
HonorableRoger J. Miner
Frank Xavier Altimari cared about people more than he cared
about legal doctrine. Although his opinions demonstrate a
mastery of the law that will be long-remembered, it was the
impact of those opinions upon the people affected by them that
was most important to him. In his exchanges with counsel at oral
argument, in his conferences with colleagues following oral
argument, in his voting memoranda and in ordinary friendly
discourse, his humanist concerns always were at the forefront of
his discourse. For Judge Altimari, decision-making involved not
only the need to apply law to facts but also the need to be
satisfied that the result was fair to every person touched by the
decision. He knew that there were stories behind every case, and
those who peopled the stories were the objects of his curiosity.
He was a student of people, and strove mightily to understand
them. Informed by his understanding of human conduct, his
strong ethical principles and his deep moral strengths, as well as
by his knowledge of the law, Frank Altimari crafted his opinions
to advance human welfare, values and dignity.
In the first sentence of his obituary in the New York Times,
Judge Altimari was described as "a senior Federal appeals judge
who wrote the ruling that affirmed the ban on begging in city
subways and transit terminals." 2 The reference was to what was
perhaps his most celebrated opinion -- Young v. New York City

Transit Authority? At issue was a regulation prohibiting
panhandling and begging in the New York City subway system.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
*Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit;
Adjunct Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
'See Chau Lan, Obituaries: Frank Altinari, Federal Judge Who Made
Major NYC Decision, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1998, at A42.
2 Wolfgang Saxon, Frank X Altimari, 69, Judge Who Affirmed Ban on
Begging, N.Y. T)IES, July 21, 1998, at D1.
3 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
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York had sustained a First Amendment challenge to the
regulation. 4 In a carefully reasoned opinion for the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals that was a veritable exegesis of First
Amendment jurisprudence, Judge Altimari reversed the judgment
of the district court.'
Characterizing begging as expressive
conduct despite "grave doubt as to whether begging and
panhandling in the subway are sufficiently imbued with a
communicative character to justify constitutional protection," 6
Judge Altimari applied to the regulation the "more lenient level of
judicial scrutiny" 7 described by the Supreme Court in United

States v. O'Brien.8 This sort of examination, he wrote, "requires
us to weigh the extent to which expression is in fact inhibited
against the governmental interest in proscribing particular
conduct."9 Judge Altimari found that the regulation was within
the constitutional power of government to adopt, that it advanced
substantial government interests and that those interests were
unrelated to suppressing free expression.1° In this case he found
that "on balance, the governmental interests must prevail."" The
opinion generated widespread public comment 2 as well as a
number of law review articles.13
Concern for human welfare shone through the opinion in Young
as much as any concern for First Amendment jurisprudence.

4

See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
' See Young, 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1990).
6 Id.at 153.
7 d. at 157.
8 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
9 Young, 903 F.2d at 157.
10See id. at 158.
"' Id. at 157.
12See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, JusticesAllow New York Subway Ban on Beggars,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1990, at A4; Deborah Squiers, Ban on Begging in
Subways is Upheld, N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1990, at 1.
13See, e.g., Grace L. Zur, Note & Comment, Young v. New York City
Transit Authority: Silencing the Beggars in the Subways, 12 PAcE L. REV.
359 (1992); Paul G. Chevigay, Begging and the First Amendment: Young v.
New York City TransitAuthority, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 525 (1991).
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Ever mindful of the impact of law on the citizenry, Judge
Altimari wrote:
The subway is not a domain of the privileged and
Rather, it is the primary means of
powerful.
transportation for literally millions of people of modest
means, including hard-working men and women,
students and elderly pensioners who live in and around
New York City and who are dependent on the subway
for the conduct of their daily affairs. They are the bulk
of the subway's patronage, and the City has an obvious
interest in providing them with a reasonably safe,
propitious and benign means of public transportation. In
determining the validity of the ban, we must be attentive
lest a rigid, mechanistic application of some legal
doctrine gainsays the common good. In our estimation,
the regulation at issue here is justified by legitimate,
indeed compelling, governmental interests. We think
that the district court's analysis reflects an exacerbated
deference to the alleged individual rights of beggars and
panhandlers to the great detriment of the common
good.14
In his analysis in Young, Judge Altimari thought it to be of
significant importance that subway passengers felt themselves
intimidated, threatened and harassed as a captive audience for
beggars in the closed confines of subway platforms and
terminals."' Finding that begging in the subway is disruptive and
startling to passengers and therefore creates the potential for
serious accidents in an environment that is crowded and fast
moving, he opined that it was "not unreasonable" for the Transit
Authority to conclude "that begging is alarmingly harmful
conduct that simply cannot be accommodated in the subway
system." 6 The phrase "common good" appears three times in
14Young, 903 F.2d at 158.
15 See id.
16

Id.
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the opinion, 7 signalling the author's notion of the weight to be
given to this objective in the adjudicatory process.
Shortly after the publication of my opinion in Loper v. New
York City Police Department,3 Judge Altimari called to discuss
that decision with me. The opinion invalidated a provision of the
New York State Penal Law prohibiting loitering for the purpose
of begging. 9 The district court had certified a class consisting of
all "needy persons who live in the State of New York, who beg
on the public streets or in the public parks of New York City."2"
The opinion determined that the statute did not square with the
First Amendment because it prohibited verbal speech as well as
communicative conduct in quintessential public fora -- the streets

and parks of the City of New York. Judge Altimari told me that
he agreed with the opinion although he knew that there were
those who considered it in some ways inconsistent with his
opinion in Young. He did not see any inconsistency. He thought
that begging in the streets implicated different interests than
begging in the confined spaces of the subways. He agreed with
the public forum analysis in Loper, but also thought that human
values dictated that indigent persons should be permitted to solicit
alms in a peaceful way and in a setting where underground train
tracks are not close by.
Frank Altimari's humanist concerns surfaced in almost every
one of his opinions, and he was just as occupied with individual
rights and human dignity as he was with the "common good" and
the general welfare. In his opinion in Valmonte v. Bane,2 he was
constrained to deal with a provision of the New York Social
Services Law governing the reporting and recording of suspected
child abuse and the administrative process for review of the
reports of abuse.? The State maintained a Central Register with
17

Id. at 156, 158.

18

999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).

'9 See id. at 701 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1989)).
2' Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1033
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
21 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
22 See id. at 995 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney
1992)).
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an "indicated" listing of abusers whose names were entered upon
a finding by local social services departments of "some credible
evidence" to support the maltreatment complaints."
The
procedures allowed for a hearing after a request for expungement
was denied, but the "some credible evidence" standard was again
to be applied.2 A second administrative hearing was allowed to
those who were denied employment in the child care field on the
basis of their placement in the Central Register.2s The standard of
proof in that hearing was "fair preponderance of the evidence.""
Apparently, seventy-five percent of the those seeking
expungement from the Register pursuant to the established
administrative procedures ultimately were successful." Valmonte
was accused of excessive corporal punishment after having
slapped her daughter with a open hand. = Child protective
proceedings were dismissed in Family Court, but Valmonte was
listed in the Central Register, and a request for an expungement
was twice denied? Valmonte never sought or was denied
employment in the child care field and therefore never was
eligible for the "fair preponderance" hearing.?
Valmonte argued on appeal that, by disseminating to potential
child care employers her placement on the Central Registry, she
would be deprived of a liberty interest?' She also argued that the
procedures allowing her to challenge the placement were
constitutionally inadequate. ' Judge Altimari found that Valmonte
had standing to sue and a protected liberty interest.
He
concluded that the procedural safeguards provided were
insufficient to protect her interest, in view of the risk of
23id.

2

Ard.

See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 997.
2Id.
2s

27
28
2

30

See id. at 1003.

See id. at 997.
See id.

See id. at 998.

31See id. at 999.
32
3

3

See id. at 998.
See id. at 1001.
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erroneous deprivation 4
In his opinion, Judge Altimari
recognized the significant interest of the State in maintaining the
Central Register. 5 However, he concluded that the welfare of the
individual injured outweighed the State interest, concluding his
opinion as follows:
We hold that the high risk of error produced by the
procedural protections established by New York is
unacceptable. While the two interests at stake are fairly
evenly balanced, the risk of error tilts the balance
heavily in Valmonte's favor. The crux of the problem
with the procedures is that the "some credible evidence"
standard results in many individuals being placed on the
list who do not belong there. Those individuals must
then be deprived of an employment opportunity solely
because of their inclusion on the Central Register, and
subject to the concurrent defamation by state officials, in
order to have the opportunity to require the local DSS to
do more than merely present some credible evidence to
support the allegations."
Human dignity, as well as the constitutional right to privacy,
was the object of Frank Altimari's concern in Doe v. Cty of New
York.17 In that case, the plaintiff had filed a complaint with the
City of New York Human Rights Commission accusing an airline
of refusing to hire him because he was a single gay male
suspected to be HIV seropositive.
The Commission, the
plaintiff and the prospective employer entered into a
"Conciliation Agreement" settling the claim. 39 A confidentiality
clause was made part of the agreement, but the Commission
issued a press release disclosing the terms of the agreement.40
See id. at 1004.
15 See id. at 1005.
36
Id. at 1004-05.
34

37 15 F.3d 264 (2d
3' See id. at 265.

Cir. 1994).

39 See id.
40 See id.
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Although the release did not identify the plaintiff, the plaintiff
considered that the release included information that allowed him
to be identified by those he knew and worked with. His action
against the Commission for breach of his constitutional right to
privacy by the disclosure of his HIV status in the press release
was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim.4
In his opinion to reverse, Judge Altimari found a constitutional
right of privacy in HIV status and determined that the plaintiff
had set forth facts supporting his claim that his right to
confidentiality was not waived by filing his claim with the
Commission and agreeing to the Conciliation Agreement.'Addressing the issue of confidentiality in HIV status, Judge
Altimari wrote the following:
Extension of the right to confidentiality to personal
medical information recognizes there are few matters
that are quite so personal as the status of one's health,
and few matters the dissemination of which one would
prefer to maintain greater control over. Clearly, an
individual's choice to inform others that she has
contracted what is at this point invariably and sadly a
fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally
be allowed to make for herself. This would be true for
any serious medical condition, but is especially true with
regard to those infected with I[V or living with AIDS,
considering the unfortunately unfeeling attitude among
many in this society toward those coping with the
disease. An individual revealing that she is IIV
seropositive potentially exposes herself not to
understanding or compassion but to discrimination and
intolerance, further necessitating the extension of the
right to confidentiality over such information. We
therefore hold that Doe possesses a constitutional right to
confidentiality... in his MEV status.43
4'See Doe v. City of New York, 825 F.Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
See Doe, 15 F.3d at 269.
43

Id. at 267.
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In this opinion, as much as in any other, Frank Altimari
demonstrated his understanding of human nature as well as the
part (albeit small) that courts can play in promoting societal
concepts of human ethical conduct.
Judge Altimari strongly believed that human values could be
promoted by the judicial system and that it was essential to this
purpose that the court be open to the public at all times. In Ayala
v. Speckard,4 he was confronted with a situation in which a state
trial judge closed the courtroom during the testimony of an
undercover police officer in a drug case." At a closed hearing,
the officer described a general fear for his safety if he were to be
recognized in the courtroom.'
He also said that he sought
closure of the courtroom every time he testified.' Judge Altimari
thought that the officer had failed to present evidence sufficient to
justify closure, noting the officer's failure to state a particularized
fear referable to the pending case and his failure to suggest that
his undercover status would be revealed during his testimony in
open court. 41 Stressing the importance of the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial, Judge Altimari wrote the following:
It is clear... that the State failed to establish the existence of
a substantial probability that an overriding interest would
likely have been prejudiced by [the officer's] testimony in
open court. While it is undisputed that the State has an
overriding interest in protecting the safety, as well as the
confidentiality, of its undercover officers, nothing in the
record below evinces a substantial probability that testifying
in Ayala's trial would have endangered [the officer's]
safety or blown his cover.49

44 89

F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996).

4

See id. at 92.

4

See id. at 93.

47See id.
4

49

See id. at 94-96.
at 95 (citation omitted).

1Id.
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As an alternative ground for remanding for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus in Ayala, Judge Altimari found error in the
failure of the state trial judge sua sponte to consider alternatives
to complete closure of the courtroom.- Judge Altimari felt very
strongly about this and wrote that, "prior to abridging a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, trial courts are under an
absolute duty to consider possible alternatives to complete
courtroom closure." 51 On a petition for rehearing, the Ayala
panel filed a per curiam opinion confirming the issuance of the
writ.5 2 The principal basis for the opinion on rehearing was the
trial court's failure to consider alternatives to closure sua
sponte.5 3 On rehearing, the panel recognized the existence of an
argument that the State might be able to establish a substantial
possibility of prejudice to its interest in minimizing the risk of
compromising the officer's effectiveness - an argument not
raised or addressed in the original appeal. The thoughts of Frank
Altimari rang through the conclusion of the panel opinion on
rehearing:
Efficient law enforcement and the right to a public trial
may at times be incompatible. The guarantees found in
the Bill of Rights carry societal costs. The costs of the
public trial right are most dramatic where, as here, the
trial court did not take proper steps at the time the
courtroom was closed. But having failed to have
considered, and adopted if feasible, less drastic
alternatives, the courtroom closure in this case violated
the Constitution. We are aware of the scourge of illegal
drugs in our society, and the importance of
governmental efforts to fight their proliferation. But
those efforts do not independently justify improper
courtroom closure.'
"0
See id. at 95-96.
51
Id. at 96.
52 Ayala v. Speckard, 102 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
53 See id. at 652.
541d.

at 654.
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Ultimately, Judge Altimari (and Judge Cardamone) joined in a
dissent written by Judge Parker in Ayala and two other cases
joined for rehearing in bane on the courtroom closure issue."
The in bane court majority concluded that:
in all three cases the prosecution sufficiently justified the
courtroom closure, and

.

.

.

a trial judge, having

already considered closure during the testimony of one
witness as an alternative to complete closure, is not
required to consider sua sponte further alternatives to
closure but needs to consider only further alternatives
suggested by the parties.56
The dissenters reiterated Judge Altirnari's thesis that Supreme
Court precedent "requires a trial judge to consider sua sponte
alternatives to courtroom closure in a case where alternatives
are
57
not suggested by a party otherwise objecting to closure."
A unique practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is the exchange of voting memoranda by the
judges.58 These memoranda are now used from time to time by
three judge panels and are always used in an in bane panel
voting. The "voting memos," as they are called, set forth not
only a judge's vote on case disposition but also the thoughts and
reasoning of the judge in arriving at the vote. The memos
circulated by Judge Altimari always were interesting,
illuminating, thoughtful and often humorous. In voting on the
suggestion for in banc review of the Ayala trilogy of cases, Judge
Altimari drew on many years of experience as a trial judge to
inform his colleagues of courtroom closure consequences and
alternatives. The "Memorandum of FXA," setting forth his
55 See Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (en bane) (Parker,

J.,56dissenting).
d. at 64.
5 Id. at 75 (Parker, J., dissenting).
See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Custonms and Practices of The Second
Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 297, 298-303 (1986).
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opinion that "it might be prudent to in banc" the three cases,
included the following practical observations:
Having sat on the bench for many years in both state and
federal trial courts, I can tell you that even absolute
closure of the courtroom will not protect the identity of
an undercover cop. Should the defendant, who has a
constitutional right to be present during the trial, want to
harm the officer, there is nothing to prevent him from
describing the officer, in great detail, to his friends and
family during visiting hours ....
If tfie prosecution presented a good argument for closure
of the courtroom, I considered alternatives to complete
closure. Frequently the officer's identity would be
hidden by a screen; and on more than one occasion, I
would direct that the officer be disguised in such a way
(wig, hat, fake mustache or beard, dark glasses, etc.)
that even his own mother would not recognize him. 59
Experience on the trial bench helped to make Frank Altimari
the outstanding appellate judge and humanist that he was. For it
was on the trial bench, more than on the appellate bench, that he
was able to get close enough to people to be able to observe their
traits and foibles.
It was there that he developed his
understanding of human behavior, and it was there that he
became acutely aware of individual sensibilities and sensitivities.
In Nassau County, New York, he served as a District Judge, a
County Judge and a state Supreme Court Justice. From 1982 to
1985, he served as a United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of New York. Before he served on these trial courts, he
was a trial lawyer. For many years, he taught courses in trial
tactics to law students and practicing lawyers. Frank Altimari
" Memorandum of FXA to In Bane Court (March 26, 1997) (on file with
author).
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very much enjoyed being of service to people in what he
described as "the courts closest to the people." He was
especially respectful of the work of trial judges and, in reviewing
their work when he was an appellate judge, he always said that he
"didn't want to second-guess a trial judge."
People mattered to Frank Altimari. Those who mattered the
most to him were his wife, Angela and his four children -Anthony, Nicholas, Michael and Vera. His colleagues mattered.
The litigants in the cases before him mattered. He was an
unusual man, a talented man. Late in life, he took up the art of
sculpture and his untutored work drew gasps and praise from
professional sculptors. His works of sculpture had religious
themes, for he was a religious man. The sculpture named "Lady
Justice" was in that category, for he approached justice with a
religious fervor. I was proud to be his friend, for his friends
mattered very much to Frank Altimari. He was always there to
inquire about a friend's health, family and work. He touched
many lives, and mine was one of them. Now, as I discuss cases
with colleagues and as I draft opinions, memoranda and law
review articles, I hear him speak to me: "The people, Roger,
what about the people? They are all that truly matters."
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